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Abstract
How many cartels are there? The answer is important in assessing the need
for competition policy. We present a Hidden Markov Model that answers the
question, taking into account that often we do not know whether a cartel exists
in an industry or not. We take the model to data from a period of legal cartels -
Finnish manufacturing industries 1951 - 1990. Our estimates suggest that once
born, cartels are persistent; by the end of the period, almost all industries were
cartellized. Our model may be extended to identify key policy parameters from
data generated under diﬀerent competition policy regimes.
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A nation built on cartels
(Historian Markku Kuisma (2010) on Finland).
1 Introduction
Little is known of the prevalence of cartels and, consequently, the need for
competition policy. A key reason for this state of aﬀairs is that important
statistics, such as the proportion of industries (markets) that have a cartel
under an existing competition policy regime, or would have a cartel if there was
no competition policy, are unknown.1 These statistics are unknown primarily
because of a lack of tools to deal with a peculiar feature of cartel data: Most
of the time, it is not known whether an industry has a cartel or not. The
available data depend on 1) the prevalence of cartels, 2) the probability that
cartels get exposed and 3) the probability that the cartels' (non)existence in the
time periods prior to their exposure can be established.2 This data generation
and exposure process, once linked to a theoretical (Markov) model of cartel
behavior, maps into a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) that provides a tool for
competition policy analysis. We take this HMM to inter-industry panel data on
nationwide Finnish legal manufacturing cartels from 1951 to 1990 and estimate
the number of cartels in the (from a modern viewpoint counterfactual) state of
no active competition policy.
Our HMM consists of a hidden process and an observation process that re-
veals information on the hidden state of the industry for some periods, but not
for others. These processes can be adapted to the dynamics of cartel behavior
and to the institutional environment. To show how, we use a recent theoreti-
1The cartels we study in this paper are deﬁned by the Competition Authority to be nation-
and therefore also industry-wide, covering all (e.g. regional) markets.
2An important implication of this data generation and exposure process is that a naive
comparison of the proportion of observed cartels to that of non-cartellized industries would
yield a biased estimate of the prevalence of cartels.
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cal Markov model where industries form and dissolve cartels (Harrington and
Chang 2009, Chang and Harrington 2010, referred to jointly as CH henceforth).3
In this model, cartels face an incentive compatibility constraint (ICC). If the
constraint is violated, the cartel breaks down completely. If there was no cartel
in the previous period, the industry gets an opportunity to form a cartel with
positive probability. Success in forming the cartel is subject to the ICC not
being violated. We map the key elements of this Markov model into a HMM.
Prior to the emergence of New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO;
see Bresnahan 1989) most cartel research used inter-industry data (e.g. Frass
and Greer 1977 and Hay and Kelley 1974). More recently, Symeonidis' work on
cartels (see Symeonidis 2002) has made use of the inter-industry variation in pol-
icy changes to identify the treatment eﬀect of cartellization. Bryant and Eckard
(1991) use U.S. data on exposed horizontal price ﬁxing agreements 1961-1988
and estimate the probability of detection by the Competition Authority (CA).
Other examples of the inter-industry approach include Levenstein and Suslow's
(in press) study of international cartels, Miller's (2009) paper on the number of
exposed U.S. cartels and Brenner's (2009) analysis of European Commission's
leniency program.
Examples of the NEIO strand of the literature using data on individual
industries/markets are Porter (1983), Lee and Porter (1984), Ellison (1994),
Pesendorfer (2000), Porter and Zona (1993, 1999), Genesove and Mullin (1998,
2001), Knittel and Stango (2003), Röller and Steen (2006) and Asker (2010).
These papers demonstrate the inner workings of a cartel. As a group, they reveal
a considerable amount of heterogeneity in how cartels operate, how eﬀective they
are in sustaining collusive outcomes and in the welfare losses they generate.
3Building on similar insights, Miller (2009) independently develops a dynamic (Markov)
model of cartel formation and dissolution and studies, using aggregate data on the number
of exposed U.S. cartels, whether the leniency program that the U.S. Department of Justice
introduced in 1993 reduced cartellization.
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Our most important precursors are Porter (1983), Lee and Porter (1984) and
Ellison (1994) who all study the Joint Executive Committee, i.e., the Chicago-
Atlantic seaboard railway cartel from the 1880s. Porter (1983) and Lee and
Porter (1984) allow for two hidden states of the industry - collusion and price-
war in their set-up - and utilize an imperfect indicator to identify the collusive
state of the industry. Ellison (1994) extends their empirical work by bringing
in a Markov structure for the hidden process. These authors' objective is to
estimate the collusive status of the industry and the eﬀect of collusion on the
supply relation. They utilize data on demand, cost, and collusive markers.
Another important precursor is Knittel and Stango (2003), who study collusion
in the local U.S. credit card markets.
Unlike that of earlier work, our objective is to estimate the prevalence of
cartels using data that are revealed by CA actions.4 Methodologically, the
major diﬀerence between our and the preceding work is that we introduce the
HMM modeling structure. In particular, we allow explicitly for the possibility
that the state of the industry is unknown (to the researcher/CA) instead of
allowing for regime classiﬁcation mistakes.5 The possibility that the state of
the industry is unknown means that our model can be readily applied to a
cross-section (or panel) of industries or markets; something one may want to
do when studying prevalence of cartels and competition policy. The higher the
number of industries in the data, the more likely it is that the researcher faces
the situation where she cannot with conﬁdence assign a cartel/no-cartel status
to some observation(s). Indeed, we would think - and this deﬁnitely holds in our
4The CA actions may reveal demand and cost data on the investigated industries, but
nothing about the remaining industries. Collecting demand and cost data on these may be
prohibitive.
5Given the type of data typically available, the earlier models would require the researcher
to assign either the status cartel or no cartel to each observation, while allowing for mistakes
in this assignment. That is, the previous models assign probability zero to the event that the
observed state of an observation is unknown. Our HMM relates to the earlier models, as it
can allow both for mistakes in labeling and the possibility that the state of the industry is not
known.
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application - that most of the observations are assigned the status unknown.
We take our HMM model to panel data on 234 Finnish manufacturing indus-
tries from 1951 to 1990. Beneﬁts of these data are the length of the observation
period and the shared institutional environment. In 109 industries, there was
at least one known nationwide horizontal cartel in existence some time between
1951 - 1990. For the remaining 125 industries it is unknown whether a cartel
ever existed. We have obtained data on the cartels from the Registry estab-
lished in 1958 after the ﬁrst Finnish competition law was enacted. Similar
registries existed e.g. in Austria, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, all
Nordic countries and Australia. Cartels were legal during our whole observa-
tion period. They ended in the Registry either through self-reporting or through
the CA approaching them. We can assign some industry-year observations to be
cartel (non-cartel) observations, while for the majority we stay agnostic, assign-
ing them status unknown.6 We augment these data with industrial statistics,
macroeconomic and trade variables and variables describing the workings of the
Finnish Cartel Registry.
We estimate the parameters of the observation process of the HMM and the
process that governed the births and deaths of the cartels. The link to modern
illegal cartels is that we provide an upper bound estimate of the number of
cartels - after all, while legal cartels' existence is not aﬀected by competition
policy, they are subject to (many of) the same internal incentive problems that
illegal cartels face. We can therefore also answer the question: How cartellized
was Finnish manufacturing in the era of legal cartels? The answer is a key piece
of information in the evaluation of modern competition policy.
Our empirical application produces stark results that rhyme well with anec-
dotal accounts and developments in the institutional and economic environment
6Because of the introduction of the unknown state, our HMM allows us to circumvent the
problem of right censoring of observed cartel durations which has plagued part of the earlier
literature.
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of Finland. We ﬁnd that the chance of forming a cartel is around 20% and in-
creases over our sample period. In line with Ellison (1994), the probability of
a cartel continuing is very high (circa 90%). Our estimate of the proportion
of manufacturing industries that had a cartel is on average close to 50% over
our observation period. It is increasing over time, and reaches more than 90%
by the end of the period, with a sharp jump in the early 1970s. To probe the
robustness of these results, we perform several robustness tests and a counter-
factual analysis. Our results survive these tests. We come up with potential
explanations especially for the jump in cartellization, one of which is the high
degree of corporatism of the Finnish economy in the mid 1970s.7 In the ﬁght
against inﬂationary pressures of that period, the government seems to have
looked favorably upon ﬁrms coordinating prices. Despite this, we remain open
to the possibility that some of our results are an artefact of our modeling choices.
Taken at face value, our results suggest that strict competition policy is of ﬁrst
order importance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section, we ﬁrst
brieﬂy review the relevant parts of the Chang and Harrington cartel models.
We then show how a HMM that matches the collusive dynamics of these models
with the observed data can be speciﬁed. In the third Section, we describe the
Finnish institutional environment vis-à-vis cartels after WWII and the data.
Section four is devoted to the presentation of our results and a discussion of
their policy implications. Section ﬁve illustrates how our HMM can be extended
to allow for a modern competition policy environment. Section six concludes.
7The sentiment in Finland seems to have been favorable toward cartels during our obser-
vation period. For example, in the chapter A nation built on cartels (Kuisma 2010), the
historian Markku Kuisma makes the claim that the Finnish economy was founded on cartels
throughout the 20th century. See also Fellman (2008), who in her description of the Finnish
economic history emphasizes the importance of state-led economic growth and corporatism.
In particular, she describes how [c]artels ﬁtted well into the strongly co-operative model
until the late 1980s and how the views and economic culture changed soon after the end of
our sample period.
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2 Modeling Cartel Births and Deaths
2.1 Cartel Dynamics
We study the rate of cartellization among Finnish manufacturing industries
during an era when, bar a few exceptions that we explain in greater detail in
Section 3, cartels were legal.8 While there are many dynamic models of cartel
formation and dissolution in the literature that could also suit our purposes, we
consider a simpliﬁed version of the Chang and Harrington model that matches
the Finnish institutional environment.
CH model an industry where (identical) ﬁrms in an industry each period
simultaneously decide whether or not to collude and where collusion can be
detected by a CA. We abstract the deterrence activity of the CA from the
model but assume, as CH do, that being in a cartel is synonymous with actually
colluding (i.e., the market outcome not being competitive).9 Period-speciﬁc
proﬁts per ﬁrm under collusion are pi; ﬁrms earn αpi, α ∈ [0, 1) if they compete;
and a deviating ﬁrm earns ηpi, η > 1. The proﬁt measure pi has a continuously
diﬀerentiable c.d.f. HIC and an expected value µ. Firms have an inﬁnite horizon
with a discount factor δ.
At the beginning of a period, an industry is either in a cartel or not; this is
dictated by the previous period's outcome. If the industry is not in a cartel, it
gets an opportunity to form a cartel with probability κ ∈ (0, 1). The remaining
within-period sequence of events is the same for cartels thus born, and cartels
that existed in the previous period: Given the realization of pi (which the ﬁrms
observe prior to deciding on cartel continuation), the ICC holds and the in-
8This means that the Finnish CA, or its predecessors, did not attempt to close cartels.
Nor was there a leniency program in place.
9Being or not being in a cartel is hence a dichotomous event. For example, a price war
would be classiﬁed as a period of no cartel. In practice, the ability of cartels to raise price
may vary. Such variation can be captured by allowing for between-industry variation in model
parameters (e.g. α).
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dustry colludes. If it does not, the cartel dies. If the cartel does not dissolve,
the industry continues in state cartel into the next period. The structural
parameters of the model are thus µ, α, η, HIC , κ, and δ.
The ICC of an industry takes the form
(1− δ)pi + δY ≥ (1− δ)ηpi + δW, (1)
where Y (W ) is the scaled continuation payoﬀ from (not) being in a cartel. Both
are functions of (all of) the structural parameters. The L.H.S. of the ICC has
two parts. The ﬁrst denotes the current proﬁts and the second the continuation
payoﬀ earned if there is collusion. On the R.H.S., the ﬁrst term are the proﬁts
from deviating. Deviation will yield the competitive continuation payoﬀ W ,
which is the second R.H.S. term.
As in CH, the expected payoﬀ to being cartellized is deﬁned by a recursion
that can be solved through a ﬁxed point calculation.10 Using the ﬁxed point
with collusion, Y ∗, and rearranging (1) shows that the ICC can be rewritten in
terms of pi:
pi ≤ φ∗ (2)
where φ∗ = [ δ(1−κ)(Y
∗−αµ)
(η−1)(1−δ(1−κ)) ] on the R.H.S. is a measure of cartel stability. Car-
tels collapse internally if the proﬁt shock exceeds φ∗. We denote the probability
that this ICC is satisﬁed by H.
For our purposes, this modeling framework has an important feature: It
results in a Markov model for the hidden collusive dynamics of an industry and
generates an unobserved sequence of cartel and non-cartel periods.
10Harrington and Chang (2009) set out the conditions under which cartels may be born
when there is no leniency, whereas Chang and Harrington (2010) derive the same conditions
with leniency.
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2.2 HMM for Cartel Births and Deaths
HMMs provide a means to study dynamic processes that are observed with
noise.11 The evolution of the population of cartels matches this description,
because we typically observe the (collusive) dynamics of an industry only ir-
regularly, if at all, and only for discovered cartels. A HMM consists of an
underlying hidden (unobserved) process and an observation process. In par-
ticular, the observed data, Oit, for industry i = 1, ..., N and periods t = 1, ..., Ti
follow a HMM if the hidden states, {Zit}Tit=1, follow a Markov chain and if, given
Zit, observation Oit at time t for i is independent of the past and future hidden
states and observations (see Appendix A for a more detailed description). In
our case, the hidden process is the state of the industry and the observation
process is what the researcher knows about the state of the industry in a given
period. The dimension of the state space of the hidden process is typically either
assumed or estimated. In our case, it follows directly from economic theory and
the institutional environment.
2.2.1 Hidden Process for Cartel Births and Deaths
Consider cartel births and deaths in industry i at time t > 1. If the industry
is not in a cartel at the beginning of a period, it can try to form a cartel with
probability κit, as outlined above. Conditional on the opportunity, the cartel
is stable and becomes operational with probability Hit. If the industry is in
a cartel at the beginning of period t, then it stays alive with probability Hit.
With probability 1−Hit, an existing cartel breaks down during period t. We
link the probability of cartel dissolution to the ICC, given in (2), but other
interpretations (e.g., internal disagreements, entry) could also be given.
11Our model belongs to the class of ﬁnite Hidden Markov Models (e.g., Cappé, Moulines
and Rydén 2005, pp. 6).
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This process for cartel births and deaths means that at the end of period
t, industry i is either not in a cartel (n) or is in an on-going cartel (c).
Treating these two outcomes as the states of hidden process for Zit, its state
space is SZ = (n, c). The associated transition matrix Ait is
Ait =
 annit ancit
acnit a
cc
it
 =
 (1− κitHit) κitHit
(1−Hit) Hit
 (3)
The elements of the matrix are the transition probabilities of a ﬁrst-order
Markov chain. The cell in the upper left-corner, for example, gives P (Zit =
n|Zi,t−1 = n)=1− κitHit.12
To complete our speciﬁcation of the hidden process for cartel births and
deaths, let the R.H.S. of (2) vary over industries and time and rewrite the
inequality by subtracting from both sides the mean of the expected proﬁts under
collusion in industry i during period t (µit). This leaves a demeaned proﬁt shock,
piit−µit, to the L.H.S. of the inequality, which now takes the form of a discrete
choice equation with a particular structure on the R.H.S. With Hit denoting
the probability that the inequality holds for industry i in period t, we have
Hit = HICDM (φ
∗
it − µit) (4)
where HICDM (•) refers to the c.d.f. of the demeaned proﬁt shock. We can
think of φ∗it − µit as a function of observable characteristics (which could enter,
e.g., through µit) and the structural parameters of the model.
12It is derived as follows: If an industry is not in a cartel at t − 1, then with probability
(1 − κit) there is no opportunity to form a cartel. If there is an opportunity, the newly
born cartel may turn out to be unstable. The probability of this event is κit(1 −Hit). The
probability given in the upper left-corner cell is the sum of the probabilities of these two
events.
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2.2.2 Observed Data and the Observation Process
Our cartel data is incomplete. We therefore postulate that in each period t,
the state of industry i is either not known (u), or the industry is observed not
to be in a cartel (n) or to be in an on-going cartel (c). These three observed
cartel outcomes give the state space of the observation process, SO = (n, c, u).
Our HMM links the observed data to the hidden process that governs the
formation and dissolution of cartels. When the unobserved state of industry i
at time t is k ∈ SZ = (n, c), the probability of observing w ∈ SO = (n, c, u) is
bkit(w) = P (Oit = w|Zit = k). (5)
To derive the observation probabilities explicitly and to match them with
the institutional environment, we make the following assumptions:
First, we assume that if an industry is not in a cartel, its (true) state is
observed in the data available to the researcher with probability bnit(n) = β
n
it.
If this event happens, Oit = Zit = n. With the complementary probability
bnit(u) = 1−βnit, the state cannot be determined reliably and remains unknown. If
an industry is in a cartel, its (true) state is observed in the data with probability
bcit(c) = β
c
it. In this case, Oit = Zit = c. Again, with the complementary
probability, the status remains unknown.
This formulation of the observation process relies on the assumption that if
an industry is (is not) in a cartel, the observed data never wrongly suggest that
it is not (is). This assumption imposes bnit(c) = b
c
it(n) = 0. We stress that this
restriction may sound stronger than it is, because if and when one has reasons
to suspect that there are such errors, the status of an industry can be labeled
unknown.13 The resulting observation probability matrix Bit is
13Moreover, this assumption can be relaxed if the data contain information about potential
mistakes or mislabelings in the records. See Section 5 for an example.
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Bit =
 bnit(n) bnit(c) bnit(u)
bcit(n) b
c
it(c) b
c
it(u)
 =
 βnit 0 1− βnit
0 βcit 1− βcit
 . (6)
Because βnit≤ 1 and βcit≤ 1, the model explicitly allows for the possibility
that there are holes in our data. There are two primary reasons for such incom-
pleteness: On the one hand, information about the state of a registered cartel
can be incomplete over time. On the other hand, some cartellized industries
were never registered and some industries may not have had cartels. For these
cases, our data conservatively assign state u, as we explain in greater detail
below.
2.2.3 Identiﬁcation and Estimation
The identiﬁcation of (the parameters of) a general ﬁnite HMM follows from
the identiﬁability of mixture densities (see Cappé, Moulines and Rydén 2005, pp.
450-457). The parameters of our HMM are identiﬁed for two further reasons:
First, the theoretical model describing the formation and dissolution of cartels
allows us to circumvent the problem of identifying the dimension of the hidden
process. It directly suggest that SZ = (n, c). A second source of identiﬁcation
are the parameter restrictions that we impose on Bit.
An intuitive way to think about the identiﬁcation of our HMM is that we
have only 2+2 probabilities that call for identiﬁcation, but a greater number of
moments (transitions) that identify them. The observed transitions from c to c
and c to n identify Hit, whereas the observed transitions from n to c and n to
n identify κit. Finally, the ratios of c to u and n to u identify β
c
it and β
n
it.
To derive the likelihood of the HMM, we take two steps. First, we assume an
initial distribution for Zi1, i.e. the probability that unit i is in the unobserved
12
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state k ∈ SZ in the initial period:
τki = P (Zi1 = k) . (7)
Second, we let Θ denote the model parameters, Di1 a (2 × 1) vector with
elements dki1(w) = τ
k
i b
k
i1(w), Dit a (2 × 2) matrix with elements djkit (w) =
ajkit b
k
it(w) for t > 1, and 1 a (2× 1) vector of ones. The likelihood for the whole
observed data can then be written as (see e.g. Zucchini and MacDonald 2009,
p. 37 and Altman 2007)
L(Θ;o) =
N∏
i=1
{
(Di1)
′
(
Ti∏
t=2
Dit
)
1
}
(8)
where o denotes the data (the realization of O).14
Four comments about the HMM and its estimation are in order: First, while
the maximization of L(Θ;o) may be a non-trivial matter, (direct) numerical
maximization methods can be used (Zucchini and MacDonald 2009, Chapter 3;
Turner 2008). Typically, a normalization (scaling) is used to avoid numerical
underﬂow. Second, because {τni , κit, Hit, βcit, βnit} are all probabilities, a simple
way to parametrize them is to assume a standard probability model for each of
them. Third, estimation of the parameters of Hit, as given by (4), can take two
routes. One way to proceed is to estimate a reduced form of this probability. The
other possibility is to estimate Hit structurally, but this requires that the ﬁxed
point with collusion (Y ∗) and the associated threshold (φ∗) are computed.15
14Picking the appropriate elements from Ait and Bit, we can determine d
jk
it (w) = a
jk
it b
k
it(w)
for t > 1, i.e., the elements of matrix Dit of the likelihood function that is given as equation
(8). If, for example, oit = c, the upper left-corner cell of Dit is d
nn
it (w) = a
nn
it b
n
it(c) = 0.
For t = 1, the elements of the vector Di1, d
k
it = τ
k
i b
k
i1(w), in the likelihood function can be
determined similarly.
15The estimation routine could be e.g. a nested ﬁxed point algorithm where one starts from
some initial values for the estimated parameters, calculates the ﬁxed point (i.e., the value of
φ∗), proceeds to re-estimate the structural parameters by ML, and continues until convergence
is achieved. Natural candidates for initial values would be the parameter estimates from a
model where Hit has been modeled in reduced form. An issue one would have to solve is how
13
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Finally, the HMM summarized above can in principle be extended to allow
for unobserved heterogeneity. The HMM literature (see e.g. Altman 2007)
has thus far introduced unobserved heterogeneity only into models that lack
the theoretical structure of our HMM. To bring in unobserved heterogeneity
properly into our HMM would require modeling it within the theoretical model.
This extension is beyond the scope of this paper.
2.2.4 State Prediction
A convenient feature of HMMs is that the hidden states of the underlying
Markov model can be analyzed in a relatively straightforward way (see Appendix
B for a more detailed description of some of these methods). The HMM allows
for example for period-by-period inference about the state of the Markov chain
that is most likely to have given rise to the observed data for a given industry in
a given period. This procedure is called 'local decoding'. In a cartel application,
this feature means that one can deduce the likelihood for the existence of a cartel
in a given industry for those periods for which the observed data are not directly
informative about the state of that industry (i.e., the u's).
3 The Institutional Environment and Data
3.1 The Institutional Environment and the Cartel Reg-
istry
The Finnish institutional environment vis-á-vis cartels mirrors wider Euro-
pean and especially Swedish developments both before and after WWII. Before
the war there was no competition law. The apparent reason was the prevailing
to deal with the potential multiplicity of Y ∗. See CH for a discussion of multiple equilibria in
their model. Alternatively, the recently introduced MPEC algorithm could be utilized (Judd
and Su 2010).
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liberal view which held that contractual freedom entailed also the right to form
cartels (see Fellman 2008, 2009). This view started to change in 1948 when a
government committee was set to provide a framework for competition legis-
lation. We focus on the developments after 1950, because the heavy wartime
regulations were mostly lifted by early 1950s.16
The ﬁrst cartel law, eﬀective from 1958, was built around the idea of making
cartels public through registration. Registration, however, was to be done solely
on authorities' request. Only tender (procurement) cartels became illegal, and
even these were apparently not eﬀectively barred from operation (Purasjoki and
Jokinen 2001). Vertical price ﬁxing could be banned if deemed particularly
harmful. The law embodied the prevailing thinking of cartels not (necessarily)
being harmful. A Finnish CA was set up to register the cartels. Here Finland
followed Norway and Sweden, which set up similar registers in 1926 and 1946.
The CA sent out 9750 inquiries by 1962 and registered 243 cartels (Fellman
2009). However, the fact that registration was dependent on authorities' ac-
tivism was an issue. To tackle this, the law was slightly revised in 1964. Those
cartels that established formal bodies, such as associations, now had to regis-
ter, but cartels without formal organizations were still exempt from compulsory
registration. The law was again revised in 1973. The single largest change ap-
pears to have been that the obligation to register was again widened. Finland
ﬁnally edged towards modern competition law with a committee that started
its work in 1985, resulting in a new law in 1988. This law gave the newly es-
tablished Finnish Competition Authority (new FCA) the right to abolish agree-
ments that were deemed harmful. The law also abolished cartel agreements'
status as legally binding contracts. The new FCA initiated a negotiation round
with cartels where these were asked to provide reasons why they should be al-
16See. e.g. Väyrynen (1990, pp. 69): The wider public will remember 1954 as the year
when the remaining regulations were abolished.
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lowed to continue. In 1992 the law was again changed (and took eﬀect in 1993):
Only now did cartels become illegal.
The former and current Director Generals of the Finnish CA (Purasjoki
and Jokinen, 2001) sum up the environment prior to the 1988 law: Time was
such that there seemed no need to intervene even in clear-cut cases, especially
if they had been registered. Registration had been transformed into a sign of
acceptability of the [cartel] agreement, at least for the parties involved [in the
cartel].17 Based on this, we end our analysis to 1990.
3.2 Data Sources and Description
Our data come from three main sources, Statistics Finland, The Research
Institute of the Finnish Economy and the Finnish Cartel Registry. The ﬁrst
provides us with 2-digit ISIC level industrial statistics, the second provides us
with GDP and trade ﬁgures, and the third is our sole source of cartel data.
3.2.1 Registry and Sample
Over the period of its existence the Finnish Cartel Registry registered 900
cartels. For each cartel, there is a folder containing the entire correspondence
between the Registry and the cartel (members). For many cartels, the cartel
contract is also available. In addition to information on the entry into and exit
from the Registry, this information allows us to pin down the actual birth and/or
death dates of some cartels and/or their (non-) existence in certain industries
and years. The Registry also assigned a 4-digit ISIC type of code to each cartel.
Our unit of analysis is a 4-digit ISIC manufacturing industry. While not optimal,
data constraints unfortunately prevent an analysis at a more detailed level (e.g.
17Purasjoki and Jokinen (2001) mention a few cartels that were not registered, but they do
not explain how these cartels were exposed (apart from them being exposed as part of the
negotiation initiative set up by the new FCA in the late 1980s). This nevertheless conﬁrms
that the Registry was not complete.
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at regional and/or product level). To ameliorate problems arising from this, we
concentrate on nationwide manufacturing cartels. The total number of 4-digit
manufacturing industries in Finland is 234, and we follow them from 1951 to
1990.
Given that archive work is both time consuming and expensive, the paper
archive of the Registry large and the number of cartels high, we didn't have the
option of including all manufacturing cartels in our sample.18 Our sample of
cartels consists of the ﬁrst registered horizontal cartel from each manufacturing
industry.19 We end up including 109 cartels.
While this sampling scheme may appear to introduce a potential problem
due to us not including potential later cartels, this is not the case: Our HMM
model by design allows for incomplete sampling. As explained below, the later
cartels in an industry where another cartel existed earlier do not call for a
treatment diﬀerent from those (potentially existing) cartels in industries where
no cartel was ever registered.
3.2.2 The Deﬁnition of States
The Registry contains information on seven types of events that the regis-
tered cartels (may) have experienced between 1951-1990. First, we know for all
the registered cartels the date when they entered the Registry (`register birth' -
trb). For many cartels we know when they exited the Registry (`register death'
- trd). The Registry also has occasionally information on a cartel changing its
contract (`contract change' - tcc), such as an addition of members. There can
18We have been through the folders using a semi-structured approach: After initial discus-
sions on what it is that we want to record, we randomly chose 8 cartels and had 4 researchers
(including two of us) go independently through the material to establish whether the infor-
mation we sought was available, and if, how to record it. We then checked the 4 individuals'
records against each other, and decided on a common approach and interpretation of e.g.
various wordings that we encountered. We then followed a written protocol in collecting the
information.
19In the rare cases when cartels were registered simultaneously, we checked that they indeed
are separate cartels and if so, included them into the sample.
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be many such events per cartel. For some cartels, we can establish their actual
birth (`birth' - tb) and/or the death date (`death' - td). In addition, there were
incidences where a cartel was observed to be operational prior to the registered
birth (`actually alive' - taa) and also some incidences where we found proof of
the cartel being alive after their registered birth and before their (registered)
death (`still alive' - tsa).
We use these events to deﬁne what the observed state of industry i is in year
t. The observation state space is SO = (n, c, u) and we assign all industry-year
observations into one of these states. How we do this is illustrated in Figure 1.
Keep in mind that our interpretation of state c is (in line with CH) that not
only was there a cartel agreement in place, but also that the cartel was active.
Similarly, state n is interpreted to mean competition. Any observation that
cannot be given such an interpretation is assigned into state u. This mechanism
means that if an industry does not show up in the Registry at all, all observations
for it are assigned into u.
[Figure 1  Time-line for state-deﬁnition and observed cartel incidences here]
Cartels for whom we observe the actual birth date tb or for whom we have
information on the cartel being actually alive some year prior to register birth
(taa) are assumed to be alive between tb (taa) and the date of register birth
(trb). Correspondingly, cartels for whom we know the actual death date (td)
are presumed to be dead between td and the date of register death (trd). In
addition, cartels are assumed to be alive every year where we observe an active
move, i.e., a `still alive' or a `contract change' incidence. We assume that a
cartel for which we can pin down the actual death date is alive the year before.
Finally, cartels are assumed dead the period prior to actual birth. For all the
other periods, the state of the observation process is u (unobserved).
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The deﬁnition of the observed states is in our view quite conservative. For
instance, even though the Registry eﬀectively assumed that the cartels were
alive between trb and trd, we only assign an industry into state c when an event
like tsa or tcc appears. The reason for including the periods between tb/taa and
trb as observed c-states is due to the assumption that when a cartel is asked
to register (at trb), it had no reason to tell any other birth date but the latest.
Correspondingly, when the Registry ﬁnds out that the cartel is dead (trd), there
is no incentive for the cartel not to inform the Registry of an actual restart be-
tween trb and trd when conﬁrming their death to the Registry. We hence record
them as n. Note also that the way in which we deﬁne observed/unobserved
states here removes the usual problem of right censoring for cartels where we
do not know the ending date.
Combining the 109 industries appearing in the Registry with the 125 in-
dustries that never entered it, we end up with a HMM data such that N =
234 and T = 40, with the following features: First, for 939 (industry-year)
observations we know the actual status of the cartel. Second, 365 of these ob-
servations are not in a cartel (n-states) and 574 are in a cartel (c-states). For
the remaining 8421 observations the status of the industries is unobserved.
3.2.3 Observed Transitions and Duration of Cartels
We have more cartel observations (c-states) during the ﬁrst 15 years of the
Registry's existence, with a peak in 1959. In this period we have few no cartel
observations (n-states). In contrast, the annual share of n observations is double
the share of c observations during the early eighties. A naive approach to
estimating the prevalence of cartels and how it has evolved over time would
use the ratio between observed c- and n-states. This approach is fundamentally
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ﬂawed for two reasons. First, it neglects the fact that most of the time we do
not know whether there is a cartel or not in a given industry. Second, it ignores
inter-temporal variation in the ratio of c- (and n-) states to u-states.
In Table 1 we show the transitions from period t− 1 to period t that follow
from our deﬁnitions of the three (observation) states. The diﬀerence between
considering the cartelized industries only and all the industries is that in the
latter case, we observe a lot more transitions from u to u. For those industries
with a registered cartel, 78% of the observations are transitions from u to u
whereas in the whole data, the proportion is 90%. Adding the industries that
do not have an exposed cartel obviously yield no more information on transitions
from state n to c or vice versa, but crucially, do aﬀect the cell probabilities.
[Table 1  Observed transitions here]
In the prior literature, register data are often assumed to be roughly in line
with the underlying true distribution of cartel births and deaths. Clearly this
is not the case in our data: The representative cartel was on average born 3.6
years earlier than it was registered and died 2.6 years earlier than it exited
the Registry. If the Registry dates were used, we would ﬁnd too few short
lived cartels due to late registration of cartel deaths. The adjusted birth and
death dates suggest that the modal cartel lives for 4-6 years, echoing Levenstein
and Suslow's (in press) analysis of 81 illegal international cartels. However,
the mean adjusted duration of our legal cartels (13 years) is somewhat longer
than what others studying illegal cartels have found. The closest study to ours
is Jacquemin, Nambu and Dewez (1981) who, studying legal Japanese export
cartels, ﬁnd an average duration of 10 years.
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3.2.4 Explanatory Variables
We use four types of explanatory variables: Variables describing 1) how the
Registry worked; 2) the macroeconomic environment; 3) the industries; and
4) the Finnish foreign trade. We describe them below and provide summary
statistics in Table 2.
[Table 2 - Descriptive statistics here]
Workings of the Registry
The ability of the Registry to detect the births and deaths of cartels may
have varied over time. To accommodate this and to control for our sampling
scheme, we make the two observation probabilities (βcit and β
n
it ) each a function
of two variables: First, we let βcit (β
n
it ) vary with the number of cartels that
entered (exited) the Registry in year t − 1. Second, we allow βcit (βnit ) to be a
function of the (once) lagged cumulative number of registered births (deaths).
These variables are denoted (Birth−flow, Birth−stock,Death−flow,Death−
stock) and they are computed using the data from the whole Registry with 900
cartels.20 As shown in Appendix C, there is a weak negative trend and a lot of
variation over time in the total number of annually registered cartels. There is
an upward trend in the number of Registry deaths.
20Our sampling scheme means that after the register death of a cartel, the probability of
observing a cartel in the same industry is zero. Another feature of the data is that by design,
we have very few observations of a cartel not existing (state n) prior to the Registry being
established. This implies that the (estimated) probability of observing state n should be small
prior to the Registry starting to operate. We could impose these constraints in the estimation.
We instead allow the observation probabilities βcit and β
n
it to vary over time in a ﬂexible way
and check that the estimated probabilities are consistent with these particularities of our
sampling scheme.
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Macroeconomic Demand Fluctuations
There is a large cartel literature focusing on the importance of demand
and business cycle ﬂuctuations for cartels. Most notable are Green and Porter
(1984), whose model suggests that price wars will arise in response to unobserved
negative demand shocks, and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), whose model pre-
dicts price wars during booms (later discussed by e.g. Haltiwanger and Har-
rington 1991). The literature suggests that cartel formation may be linked to
the growth trend as well as to idiosyncratic changes in demand not anticipated
by the cartel (Jacquemin, Nambu and Dewez 1981 and Suslow 2005).
We have a long panel with 40 years of data over a period in which the Finnish
macroeconomy went through large business cycle changes. To utilize this varia-
tion, we include macroeconomic variables into the HMM. We detrend the GDP
volume index using the Hodrick and Prescott ﬁlter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997),
decomposing GDP into the long run growth trend (HP − trend) and deviations
from the long run trend. We decompose the deviations into two variables, one
capturing positive deviations from the long run trend (GDP−pos), and another
capturing all negative deviations from the long run trend (GDP −neg).21 Time
series of these variables are displayed in Appendix C.
Industry Characteristics
Several authors have focused on the importance of industry characteristics
when explaining cartel formation. Slade (1989, 1990) suggests, for example,
that price wars can arise from changes in industry characteristics. Cartel mem-
bers' knowledge of fundamental structural parameters may be incomplete, and
industry speciﬁc shocks (e.g., negative sales shocks) may change the equilibrium
21Detrending was done using a smoothing index of 100. Note that both deviations are
deﬁned in absolute terms.
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prices. We therefore include the gross value of production over time (GV P ), as
measured at the level of 2-digit industries.22 Among others, Bradburd and Over
(1982) argue that organizational costs of both cartel formation and maintenance
are expected to increase with the number of ﬁrms in an industry. We do not
have an ideal measure for the number, but can nevertheless include the number
of plants, as measured at the 2-digit level (Plants). We also include the ratio
of raw material expenses to the gross value of production (Materialshare) as
a measure of (average) variable costs of production. The ratio of blue collar
working hours to the gross value of production (Hours/GV P ) is a measure of
(the inverse of) labor productivity.
Trade Variables
As Finland is a small open economy, both imports and exports are poten-
tially important factors inﬂuencing cartellization. The average GDP-share of
foreign trade (=exports+imports divided by GDP) was 32.1%, calculated over
our sample period. Export shocks can be thought of as analogous to demand
shocks in their eﬀects on cartellization. Imports are a source of competition for
domestic ﬁrms and therefore would be expected to have a similar impact as a
lowering of entry barriers. Exports (imports) grow during our sample period on
average 4.2 (5.1) per cent a year, with some sizable short term ﬂuctuations.
A peculiar feature of Finnish foreign trade, to which we turn in more detail
below, is the important role played by bilateral trade with the Soviet Union
which averaged 17% of all exports over our sample period. There were also
important institutional changes in the foreign trade with the market economies,
with Finland joining (the European Free Trade Area) EFTA as an associate
22We use 2-digit ISIC data because of diﬃculties in tracking industries across three changes
in the 4-digit industry deﬁnitions that take place during our observation period. As the data
was not available in electronic form, we collected data for every 4th year and interpolated the
values in between.
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member in 1961 and as a full member in 1986, and signing a free-trade agreement
(which abolished custom duties starting 1977) with the EU in 1973. We use
deﬂated goods exports (Exports) and goods imports (Imports) as our trade
variables. We display the time series for these variables in Appendix C.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Parameter Estimates
Our legal era HMM is estimated with ML, using the likelihood function (8). We
parametrize the transition and observation probabilities as single index func-
tions. This means, for example, that we impose κit= Φ (κ
′xit), where Φ(•) is
the c.d.f. of the normal distribution, xit denotes the explanatory variables and
κ is the parameter vector to be estimated.23 Note that the theoretical model
on which we build is stationary, but our HMM is not. The covariates allow
both for temporal (e.g., secular growth and business cycles) and cross-sectional
variation.
We present the main estimation results in Tables 3 and 4: In both tables,
Model 1 includes only macro covariates (third order polynomial of HP − trend,
and the GDP deviations) for Hit and κit, Model 2 includes also the industry
characteristics, and in Model 3 we add trade variables. The observation prob-
abilities are in all models linear in the two ﬂow variables and quadratic in the
two stock variables. The initial condition τn is always estimated.
[Table 3-4 - Estimation results here]
23Given that there are no modern competition policy parameters that could enter the ICC in
our data (due to cartels being legal), the gain from estimating Hit structurally is very minor.
In particular, we lack knowledge of the values of the competition policy parameters, rendering
the execution of a meaningful counterfactual exercise impossible. We therefore estimate a
reduced form of it.
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Starting with Hit (Table 3), we ﬁnd that all the coeﬃcients of HP − trend
are signiﬁcant, suggesting a nonlinear relationship between the level of GDP
and the probability of the ICC holding. In ﬁve out of six cases, both types
of shocks to GDP aﬀect the probability of the ICC holding positively. Adding
industry variables (Model 2) has very little eﬀect on the macro variables and
none of the industry characteristics are signiﬁcant. In Model 3, exports carry
a negative and signiﬁcant, imports a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. While
the former, at least when interpreted as a positive demand shock, is in line with
the Chang and Harrington (and Lee and Porter) style arguments, the latter is
on the face of it unintuitive as it suggests that increased competition increases
the probability of a cartel. Including the trade variables has some eﬀect on
the other variables' coeﬃcients. Notably, the coeﬃcient on the negative GDP
shocks increases, and the coeﬃcient of material share becomes signiﬁcant.
Turning then to κit, we ﬁnd in Model 1 that the polynomial terms of
HP − trend all carry coeﬃcients that are smaller in absolute value than those
for Hit and mostly insigniﬁcant. Positive (negative) shocks to GDP aﬀect cartel
formation positively (negatively). Adding the industry characteristics doesn't
change these results: Gross value of production and material share both ob-
tain a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. In Model 3, the trade variables are
insigniﬁcant and do not aﬀect the coeﬃcients of the other variables.
We display the parameters of the observation probabilities βcit and β
n
it in
Table 4. The ﬂow variable is signiﬁcant only in βnit. The parameters of all
the stock variables are signiﬁcant in both processes, meaning that both βcit and
βnit are nonlinear functions of the stocks. This suggests that they may indeed
control for the eﬀects of our sampling scheme (see also Figure 2 and the related
discussion below).
The ﬁnal parameter we estimate is the initial probability of not being in a
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cartel (τn). It turns out to be 95%. This high probability may be explained
by the fact that in 1951, the very strict war-time regulations that had been in
place more or less since end of 1939 had only recently been lifted.
Likelihood ratio tests suggest that the restricted speciﬁcations are rejected
against the more general alternatives. Model 3 is therefore our preferred model.24
We study its robustness below.
4.2 Cartel Dynamics
4.2.1 Dynamics of κ, H, βc and βn
We can calculate the probability of forming a cartel (κit) and the probability
that the ICC (Hit) holds for each industry-year observation in our sample. The
means over the years and industries are reported on the last row of Table 3. We
ﬁnd that on average, κit is round 0.2. The interpretation of this estimate is that
an industry that was not in a cartel last year has a 20% chance of being able to
form a cartel this year.
In contrast, the estimated probability of the ICC holding (Hit) is on average
0.9 or higher. The implication of this is that when cartels are legal, i) industries
form a cartel with a high probability if they get the chance and ii) that cartels,
once formed, are very durable. This estimate of ours is very close to that
obtained by Ellison (1994) studying the stability of a single U.S. cartel, the
Joint Executive Committee.
In Figure 2 we show the development of the cross-industry means of the
predicted Hit and κit for our preferred Model 3. The predicted probability of
24The literature on testing the ﬁt of HMM models is rather thin; see ch. 6 in Zucchini and
MacDonald (2009). This applies in particular to models with a discrete observed state space,
such as ours. One way to extend the model would be to allow for a higher-order Markov chain.
However, according to Zucchini and McDonald (pp. 119), the number of parameters of such
a model rapidly becomes prohibitely large.
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continuation is high, but exhibits a period of lower values between mid-1950s and
early 1970s before returning to levels above 0.9. The opportunity probability
(κit) varies more and exhibits a positive trend. The large increases in early
1970s, early 1980s and late 1980s seem at ﬁrst glance to be due to the large
positive shocks in the aggregate demand in these periods. Notice, however,
that κit is increasing trend-like, so even ignoring the eﬀect of the positive GDP
shocks, its value is signiﬁcantly higher at the end of our sample period than at
the beginning of it.
[Figure 2 - Development of H, κ, βc and βn]
The observation probabilities, βcit and β
n
it , are also displayed in Figure 2.
Their time-series show that the probability of observing an existing cartel starts
very high and ends being very small, while the reverse happens to the probability
of establishing that a cartel does not exist. Two features of the Figure are
reassuring in light of our sampling scheme: First, given that the Registry started
in 1959, there is essentially a zero probability of us observing that a cartel does
not exist prior to 1959. This is indeed what we ﬁnd. Second, given that we only
included the ﬁrst cartel in any given industry into our sample, the estimated
probability of detecting a cartel should decrease over time, which it does (see
fn. 20).
4.2.2 Dynamics of the Degree of Cartellization
The above results suggest that the degree of cartellization may have increased
over our sample period. We use the HMM structure of our model to illustrate
this in two ways. We employ both a recursive calculation of Pr[Zit = c] and
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a modiﬁed local decoding method to analyze the hidden states and estimate
the proportion of manufacturing industries that had a cartel in a given year.
The recursive calculation is made individually for each industry (see Appendix
B). The modiﬁed local decoding works for each industry as follows: First, the
conditional probability of the hidden state being c or n given the observed data is
calculated for each year. Second, local decoding assigns to each year that hidden
state which has the highest conditional probability. Using this probability, we
assign each u-observation a probability of the hidden state being c (or n).25
The results of this exercise, averaged over the industries and years, show
that the proportion of manufacturing industries that had a cartel is close to
50%. The time-series are displayed in Figure 3. The two methods produce very
similar results: The proportion of cartellized industries starts reasonably low
at round 6%, reﬂecting the high value of τn and the low values of κit in the
early years. It then starts to increase, and jumps upwards in the early 1970s
when both κit and Hit increase. The former has an increasing trend and a large
spike in the early 1970s. The latter starts increasing around 1969 after having
declined since the mid-1950s.
[Figure 3 - Estimated proportion of cartellized industries]
Inferring the dynamics of cartellization directly from the Registry data is
impossible. This is clearly displayed in Figure 3 where we show both the pro-
portion of c-observations in the observed (raw) data, and the proportion of
c-observations that result from our local decoding exercise. These (almost) co-
25Our adjustment to local decoding is that we assign probabilities, whereas local decoding
assigns ones and zeros. While that approach is natural e.g. in speech recognition, in our
application it would amount to throwing away information. For instance, it would assign the
hidden state c for two observations where for the ﬁrst, the probability of the hidden state
really being c is 0.51, and for the other 0.98. Note also that given our assumptions about the
observation process, each of the observations for which we observe c (n) is assigned c (n) in
the local decoding exercise.
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incide during the early years of the observation period, and then diverge, with
the estimated proportion of cartellized industries increasing and the proportion
of c-observations in the raw data decreasing.
Coupling Figure 3 with the development of the observation probabilities βcit
and βnit shown in Figure 2 explains the divergence between the raw data and
the estimated proportion of cartellized industries. Early on in the observation
period, any industry in hidden state c is almost surely observed to be in that
state as βcit is very high. At the time β
c
it starts to decline - meaning that a lower
and lower proportion of observations in hidden state c are observed to be in
that state - the two c-series start to diverge. A similar but reverse story holds
for the n-series. This also makes clear why one cannot make inference on the
degree of cartellization from the raw data alone: One needs to couple it with a
model of cartel behavior and a model of the observation process, i.e., a HMM
model like ours.
Figure 3 suggests a rather dramatic story, with the degree of cartellization in
Finnish manufacturing growing over time and reaching very high levels by the
end of the 1980s. In addition, Figures 2 and 3 suggest that the rapid increase in
the degree of cartellization may be driven by the spike in κit in the early 1970s,
and the upward trend in Hit during the same period. The spikes in κit and
the trend in Hit beg three questions: First, are they due to misspeciﬁcation of
the model in one way or the other? Second, to what extent do they drive the
high level of cartellization reached by the end of 1980s? Third, are there any
economic explanations for them? We discuss these three questions in the next
subsection.
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4.3 Robustness and Discussion
4.3.1 Robustness Tests
We probe the robustness of our results from Model 3 in ﬁve dimensions:
First, we examine the eﬀect of the initial condition on our results. We
allow for heterogeneity across industries in the initial probability of not being
in a cartel by including the industry characteristics (measured in 1951) in τn.
The industry characteristics are neither individually nor jointly signiﬁcant. The
estimated mean of τn is very close to that reported for Model 3 in Table 4 and
varies from 0.90 to 0.98. However, Finland had a tradition of export cartels that
started prior to WWII (Kuisma 1993, Fellman 2008). This tradition could have
led to the formation of domestic cartels by the beginning of our sample period.
The estimated τn may therefore seem high. To probe this, we impose a lower
value for τn (0.5) to allow for a higher degree of cartellization in 1950. Our
main qualitative results remain intact except for the naturally occuring increase
in the predicted rate of cartellization in the ﬁrst few years.
Second, we consider three speciﬁcations for the observation probabilities βcit
and βnit: We introduce industry characteristics to allow for cross-industry hetero-
geneity and allow for richer dynamics by including the third order polynomials of
the birth and death stock variables. Finally, we let the observation probabilities
reﬂect the changes in the Finnish cartel legislation and registration obligations,
introducing three indicators corresponding to the law changes taking place in
1958, 1964 and 1973. The results echo our main ﬁndings.26
Third, since it is not obvious how we should include the trade variables, we
try diﬀerent speciﬁcations for them (see also fn. 29). For instance, we estimate
Model 3 including total trade and the share of imports of total trade in κit and
26There is a convergence problem with the last model using the law change dummies. The
problem disappears when we slightly change the base speciﬁcation.
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Hit. In most speciﬁcations, trade variables are signiﬁcant only in Hit. However,
the overall results stay the same.
Fourth, we try diﬀerent speciﬁcations of business cycle dynamics. To allow
for non-linearities in the responses to business cycle shocks we include also the
squared terms of GDP − pos and GDP − neg. To check for the robustness of
using the Hodrick and Prescott ﬁlter we remove the ﬁltered variables and use
the third order polynomial of unﬁltered GDP instead. Again, the dynamics and
levels of κit and Hit remain intact, including the jump in κit.
Finally, we re-estimate our HMM using data only on the 109 industries with
a known (= registered) cartel during the sample period. This test allows a more
direct comparison to most of the existing work that only uses data on industries
that have had an exposed cartel. The results are very much in line with those
reported above, suggesting that in our case, not using data on industries which
do not have a known cartel would not bias the results greatly. This ﬁnding,
together with the above speciﬁcation checks of the observation probabilities,
suggests that our estimates of the rate of cartellization ought not to be driven
by diﬀerences between the industries for which there is a registered cartel and the
industries that never entered the Registry. Whether these observations extend
to other data sets is naturally an open question.
4.3.2 Counterfactuals
While the spike in κit plays an important role, its upward trend is much more
important. This is due to the high continuation probability Hit which means
that there was very little outﬂow from the stock of cartels.27 We perform two
27To give an example, let us use the sample averages of κit = 0.23 and Hit = 0.90. These
result in a steady state rate of cartellization of 68% with a cartel-birth (death) rate of 7%.
Reducing Hit to 0.6 (0.4) would result in 26% (14%) of industries being cartellized in the
steady state.
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counterfactuals that both are designed to shed light on the importance of the
spikes in κit. First, we replace the GDP − pos values of the years 1972-75 with
the average of all other years that had a positive shock. Second, we also replace
the large shock of 1989 with a (similarly calculated) average.
The relative importance of the GDP shocks is illustrated in Figure 4. It
displays the expected proportion of industries that have a cartel using both
actual and counterfactual data. All graphs in Figure 4 are produced using the
recursive calculation method for Pr[Zit = c] (see Appendix B).
[Figure 4 - Counterfactual]
Using the actual data, the proportion of cartellized industries increases from
34% in 1971 to 94% in 1975 and 96% in 1990. The ﬁrst (second) counterfactual
yields 34% (34%) in 1971, 79% (77%) in 1975, and 96% (95%) in 1990. These
counterfactuals show that the large GDP shocks do not drive the high degree
of cartellization at the end of our observation period.
4.3.3 Economic Explanations
In this Section we oﬀer possible but necessarily somewhat speculative explana-
tions for the early 1970s jump and trend in κit and the coinciding increase in
Hit.
Finland's bilateral trade with the Soviet Union oﬀers one explanation. The
jump in κit coincides almost perfectly with the ﬁrst oil crisis, which hit the open
Finnish economy. The resulting export shock was however positive because it
increased bilateral trade with the Soviet Union. Finland paid its Soviet oil
imports by exporting manufacturing goods. The growth in bilateral trade was
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accompanied by a diversiﬁcation of trade from being mostly ships in the early
1950s to covering a wider set of manufacturing industries by the late 1970s.
The trade between the Soviet Union and Finland was based on a centralized
inter-governmental system, and was handled through bilateral clearing accounts
(see e.g. Ollus and Simola, 2006 and Fellman 2008). The general terms of trade
were agreed at the national level, but the ﬁnal agreement was an interactive
process involving the participating companies. Production alliances were also
common (Ollus and Simola, 2006, pp. 20). The process seems to have been
conducive for non-competitive behavior and (possibly) cartel formation also in
domestic markets.28
The negotiations necessitated by the bilateral trade arrangements meant that
representatives of Finnish manufacturing ﬁrms met more often than they would
otherwise have met. This is consistent with an increase in κit.
29 Both the more
frequent interaction and the encouragement for and use of productive alliances
may have aﬀected Hit by lowering the costs of monitoring other members and
improving capacity allocation among the ﬁrms.
Another explanation is a structural change in the Finnish economic environ-
ment in 1968. That year, the ﬁrst so-called General Incomes-Policy Settlement
between the government, the labor unions and the industry (employers') as-
sociations was signed (see, e.g., Fellman 2008). This may have aﬀected Hit
because it prohibited the indexation of prices to inﬂation, meaning that the
returns to ﬁrms agreeing on prices rose. The same agreement may have aﬀected
28This has not gone unnoticed in the literature: e.g. Ollus and Simola (2006) conclude
(pp. 21): Finnish exporters to the Soviet Union were protected from external competition
which made exporters lazy. The exports favored the less competitive industries and biased
the production structure in Finland. See also Schultz (2002), who argues that export cartels
facilitate tacit collusion in the domestic markets.
29To elaborate on the timing of the jump in κit we have re-estimated our Model 3 allowing
for diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the trade variables in κit. In particular we divide exports into
Russian exports and other exports. Generally we ﬁnd the same results as before: A strong
jump in κit in the early 1970s. In some speciﬁcations, Russian exports obtains a coeﬃcient
that is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
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κit, because it is generally thought that the collective agreements also increased
strength of the labor unions. As a result, the need for ﬁrms to coordinate their
actions may have grown, meaning more opportunities to form a cartel.
More generally, the trend towards increasing corporatism, reached (accord-
ing to e.g. Virtanen 1998) its apex in the early 1970s. Virtanen writes (pp. 254):
The 1973 [competition policy] legislation marked the culmination of post-World
War II development. Competition policy in the committee report played a sub-
sidiary role as a part of public price policy. The committee viewed competition
policy as complementary to price controls in containing inﬂation. This seems to
have meant that the government either took a relaxed view, or even encouraged
price coordination among ﬁrms.30
Finally, the EEC free trade agreement negotiated from late 1960s onwards
and signed in 1973 generated a large change in the institutional environment
of Finnish manufacturing ﬁrms, creating the expectation of not only increased
access to European markets, but also of increased foreign competition in the
domestic market. The negotiation process again lead to discussions between
the government and the industry, possibly leading to an increase in κit. The
actual agreement may have aﬀected Hit for example by the industry feeling the
need to form defensive cartels whose purpose was to accommodate entry.
4.4 Summary
According to our estimates, the proportion of manufacturing industries that had
a cartel was on average close to 50% over our observation period, reaching 90%
30According to Virtanen (the Deputy Director General of FCA), the execution of price con-
trols strongly encouraged ﬁrms to establish industry associations entrusted with representing
the ﬁrms in the price control process and ﬁling common applications for increased prices to be
assessed by the price control authorities (private communication with Virtanen, March 10,
2011). This means that the price regulation authority encouraged ﬁrms in a given industry
to ﬁle common instead of individual applications (for price increases) to the authority.
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by 1990. While stark, this result is robust to the various extensions we have
tried. Our results make it clear that attempting to infer the rate of cartellization
directly from the type of raw cartel data we (and other researchers) have is
bound to fail, as such an exercise does not take into account the peculiarities of
the data generation process.
At a ﬁrst look, it appears as if our results are driven by spikes in the prob-
ability of forming a cartel and a rebound in the probability of the ICC holding.
We ﬁnd explanations for the timing of these two events. Moreover, robustness
tests show that our results are not driven by them. The results come about
through the interplay of a reasonably high probability of forming a cartel, and
a high probability of the ICC holding.
5 Extension: Illegal Cartels and Modern Com-
petition Policy
In modern data sets on discovered cartels (see, e.g., Miller 2009, Brenner 2009,
Levenstein Suslow 2006), the observed data vary but are becoming increasingly
detailed. To illustrate such data, consider how an illegal cartel is exposed. The
ﬁrst data point that is exposed is that the cartel exists in the period in which
it is either uncovered by the CA, or a member applies for leniency. The CA
may then extend its investigation into the past of the cartel and eventually,
either the CA and / or the court(s) establish the periods in which the cartel
has existed. The cartel may have existed for longer or shorter. The CA may
be able to establish that in some previous periods the cartel did not exist, or
fail to establish (non-) existence in a given period. This observation process
may produce data on the cartel's existence for some of the years preceding
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their exposure. After the investigation, a new cartel may be created in the
industry, and the cycle begins again. For a number of industries, the status of
the industry cannot be determined for any period. A prime example of such a
case is an industry that has never been investigated or convicted for having a
cartel.31
A great advantage of our HMM approach is that it can easily be tailored
to the speciﬁcs of the institutional environment. To show how, we outline here
brieﬂy a HMM for illegal cartels that allows for a probability of cartel detection,
and for a probability of applying for leniency, as in CH. These two probabil-
ities are empirically important because they are key (structural) parameters
describing the eﬃcacy of modern competition policy.
5.1 Hidden Process with Illegal Cartels
Assume that there is a CA that constantly monitors the status of each industry.
At the end of period t, the state of industry i is detected by the CA with
probability σit. If the industry is in a cartel, the cartel is shut down immediately
(and potential ﬁnes are levied). If the industry is not in a cartel, the industry
stays as is. Besides the CA, there is a corporate leniency program in place.
Following CH we postulate that ﬁrms resort to the leniency program only if
the cartel is breaking up. Conditional on it happening, the probability that the
cartel will be exposed to the CA because of a leniency application is νit.
This process for cartel births and deaths means that at the end of period t,
industry i is either not in a cartel (n), is in an on-going cartel (c), has been
detected and shut down by the CA (d) or has after the break up been exposed
to the CA because of a leniency application (l). Treating these four outcomes
31Appendix D illustrates the type of observed data that this process is likely to generate
and to which a cartel researcher might have access.
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as the states of the hidden process for Zit, its state space is SZ = (n, c, d, l).
The associated transition matrix Ait is

(1− κit) + κit(1−Hit)(1− νit) κitHit(1− σit) κitHitσit κit(1−Hit)νit
(1−Hit)(1− νit) H(1− σit) Hitσit (1−Hit)νit
(1− κit) + κit(1−Hit)(1− νit) κitHit(1− σit) κitHitσit κit(1−Hit)νit
(1− κit) + κit(1−Hit)(1− νit) κitHit(1− σit) κitHitσit κit(1−Hit)νit

.
The elements of Ait are the transition probabilities of a ﬁrst-order Markov
chain.32 We have speciﬁed Ait with particular assumptions in mind. First,
the detection probability σit shows up only in columns 2 and 3 because we
assume that the detection activities of the CA aﬀect only those states in which
an industry is in a cartel at the beginning of period t.33 Second, the ﬁrst and
two last rows are equal, because we assume that if an industry has at t − 1
been in a cartel that has been exposed to the CA, it does not aﬀect the process
that leads to the creation of new cartels in subsequent periods. Both of these
assumptions can be relaxed if the institutional environment so requires and/or
if the available cartel data are rich enough to permit a more ﬂexible model (e.g.
a larger state space).
32The cell in the upper left-corner, for example, gives P (Zit = n|Zi,t−1 = n)=(1 − κit) +
κit(1 − Hit)(1 − νit) =1 + κit (Hit(1− νit) + νit). It is derived as follows: If an industry is
not in a cartel at t − 1, then with probability (1 − κit) there is no opportunity to form a
cartel. If there is an opportunity, the newly born cartel may turn out to be unstable, but the
member ﬁrms do not apply for leniency. The probability of this event is κit(1−Hit)(1− νit).
The probability given in the upper left-corner cell is the sum of the probabilities of these two
events.
33The cell in the ﬁrst row of the third column, for example, gives the probability for the
event that an industry that has not been in a cartel at t − 1 forms a cartel during period t
but is immediately detected and shut down by the CA.
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5.2 Observation Process
In modern era data sets, the state space of the observation process has to be
augmented to SO = (n, c, d, l, u), where d refers to a cartel that has been
detected and shut down by the CA and l to a leniency application. This kind
of observed data can be linked to the hidden process in many ways.
For example, assume that (i) if an industry is (is not) in a cartel, the observed
data never wrongly suggest that it is not (is), that (ii) the exposure of a cartel
to the CA is observed (by the researcher) with probability one, and that (iii)
the observed data never suggest (to the researcher) that a cartel has been shut
down by the CA or exposed because of leniency when it really was not. The
observation probability matrix would then be
Bit =
[
bkit(w)
]
=

βnit 0 0 0 1− βnit
0 βcit 0 0 1− βcit
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0

,
where bkit(w) again denotes the probability of observing w ∈ SO = (n, c, d, l, u)
when the unobserved state of industry i at time t is k ∈ SZ = (n, c, d, l), and
bnit(n) = β
n
it and b
c
it(c) = β
c
it. Parameters β
c
it and β
n
it reﬂect the ability of the CA
(and courts) to determine, in an ex post investigation, whether a detected cartel
did or did not exist in the periods prior to the detection. They are therefore
potentially policy relevant.
Other assumptions about the observation process would lead to a diﬀerent
Bit. For example, the assumption of no labeling mistakes could be relaxed. We
could allow bcit(n) and b
n
it(c) to be nonzero to be in line with Lee and Porter
(1984) and Ellison (1994).34
34Recall that these authors had demand and cost data.
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5.3 Estimation and Identiﬁcation
The parameters of the extended model can be estimated by ML, using the
likelihood function (8). The elements of Dit needed for the likelihood can be
derived from Ait and Bit.
35
So far, we have been agnostic about the precise form of Hit. If one wants
to impose structure to it, the models of CH would give a good starting point.
We outline in Appendix D how the ICC condition has to be modiﬁed for CA
detection and leniency. With data illegal cartels, the returns to structural es-
timation of Hit are likely to be high, as it would allow a number of interesting
counterfactual experiments on competition policy.
6 Conclusions
We have shown how the data typically available on cartels yields a Hidden
Markov Model (HMM) once it is matched with a theoretical cartel model.
HMMs take into account that there is a diﬀerence between what is actually
going on (the hidden state) in an industry, and what is observed about the
industry (the observation state). In particular, HMMs allow for the possibility
that the observer/econometrician does not know whether an industry is in a
cartel or not at a given point in time. This is a very likely state of aﬀairs for
any given observation on a market or an industry. The estimation approach
can be merged with various dynamic models of cartel behavior and modiﬁed
35There are 4+2 probabilities that call for identiﬁcation in the above HMM, tailored for
illegal cartels and an active CA. The intuition of the moments that identify the parameters
is as follows: First, the observed transitions from c to c and c to n identify Hit, whereas the
observed transitions from n to c and n to n identify κit. Transitions from and to d and from
and to l allows one to identify σit and νit. Finally, the ratios of c to u and n to u identify β
c
it
and βnit.
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to ﬁt varying institutional environments. We chose the model of Harrington
and Chang (2009, see also Chang and Harrington 2010) because it endogenizes
cartel births and deaths. We emphasize that other theoretical models could be
used instead.
We have taken our HMMmodel to data on Finnish legal nationwide manufac-
turing cartels from 1951 to 1990. We ﬁnd that the mean probability of getting
the chance to form a cartel is around 20%. The probability of the incentive
compatibility condition holding is as high as 90%. We estimate the proportion
of Finnish manufacturing industries that were cartellized in our sample period
and ﬁnd that the proportion was on average close to 50% and increasing over
time. By the end of the period, most industries had a cartel. While stark, these
results are robust to various speciﬁcation tests. Our counterfactual analysis
shows that the high rate of cartellization is not generated by the positive GDP
shocks forcing a spike in the probability of forming a cartel. We oﬀer potential
explanations both for the spike and the simultaneous rise in the probability of
the incentive compatibility condition holding. The explanations have to do with
changes in the institutional environment of Finnish manufacturing. Taken at
face value, our results suggest high returns to eﬀective competition policy even
if the welfare losses from Finnish cartels were lower than the typical estimates
found in the literature. However, we remain open to the possibility that some
of our results are an artifact of our modeling choices.
Last but not least, we have shown how a cartel HMM can be extended
to match a modern competition policy environment. Such a model allows a
counterfactual analysis of diﬀerent competition policy regimes, meaning that
it is a potential tool for competition authorities and those wishing to evaluate
competition policy.
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 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Observed transitions 
Industries with a registered cartel (N=109) 
nt ct ut Row total 
n(t-1) 207 65 89 361 
(57.34) (18.01) (24.65) (100) 
c(t-1) 78 312 184 574 
(13.59) (54.36) (32.06) (100) 
u(t-1) 80 186 3050 3316 
(2.41) (5.61) (91.98) 100 
Column total 365 563 3323 4251 
(8.59) (13.24) (78.17) (100) 
All industries (N=234) 
nt ct ut Row total 
n(t-1) 207 65 89 361 
(57.3) (18.0) (24.7) (100) 
c(t-1) 78 312 184 574 
(13.6) (54.4) (32.1) (100) 
u(t-1) 80 186 7925 8191 
(1.0) (2.3) (96.8) (100) 
Column total 365 563 8198 9126 
(4.0) (6.2) (89.8) (100) 
NOTES: Reported numbers are the number of observations and percentage (%) of observations on 
the row. 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable #Obs Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
HP – trend 9360 7.22 3.09 2.79 13.17 
GDP – neg 9360 6.30 9.91 0 38.89 
GDP – pos 9360 6.24 11.23 0 42.43 
Total exports 9360 659.75 371.59 179.01 1225.41 
Total imports 9360 691.14 375.86 165.81 1256.06 
GVP 9216 2809.56 3002.39 4.41 12600 
Plants 9216 452.52 376.06 6 1602 
Hours/GVP 9216 0.021 0.017 0 0.172 
Materialshare 9216 0.573 0.137 0.122 0.919 
Death – stock 9360 153.75 172.33 0 581 
Death – flow 9360 14.53 14.02 0 47 
Birth – stock 9360 423.23 320.76 0 900 
Birth – flow 9360 22.50 16.38 0 72 
NOTES: The number of observations is lower for the industry variables than others due to 
missing observations. Total exports and imports and GVP are in million EUROs. 
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Table 3: Estimation results for H and   
H 
M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 
HP – trend -2.779*** -3.001*** -4.697*** -0.052 0.059 0.141    
(0.5781) (0.5824) (0.8796)   (0.3629) (0.3734) (0.5776)    
(HP – trend)2 0.364*** 0.392*** 0.573*** 0.072 0.053 0.052    
(0.0728) (0.0735) (0.1197)   (0.0501) (0.0517) (0.1024)    
(HP – trend)3 -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.021*** -0.004* -0.003 -0.003    
(0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0048)   (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0046)    
GDP – neg 0.007* 0.008* 0.026*** -0.012** -0.012*** -0.014*   
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0070)   (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0073)    
GDP – pos 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.003    0.031*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 
(0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0056)   (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0067)    
GVP -1.69e-05 -2.93e-05 3.57e-05 4.17e-05 
(2.23e-05) (2.28e-05)   (2.72e-05) (2.75e-05)   
Plants -0.00011 -0.00011   0.0001 0.0001    
(0.00014) (0.00014)   (0.0001) (0.0001)    
Hours/GVP 0.502 0.735    -7.130** -6.338*   
(4.2134) (4.2969)   (3.5859) (3.6031)    
Materialshare 0.759 1.105**  -1.333*** -1.390*** 
(0.5344) (0.5496)   (0.4271) (0.4380)    
Total exports -0.004*** -0.001    
(0.0010)   (0.0015)    
Total imports 0.005*** 0.0004   
(0.0012)   (0.0016)    
Constant 7.419*** 7.600*** 11.418*** -2.756*** -2.092*** -2.269*   
(1.3632) (1.3666) (2.0514)   (0.7947) (0.8393) (1.2442)    
Predictions H,   0.926 0.925 0.899 0.231 0.227 0.235 
NOTES: Reported numbers are coefficients and standard errors (s.e.). ***,**, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Reported predictions are the industry-year means of the 
estimated values. 
 
Table 4: Estimation results for c  and n  and the initial probability ( n ) 
c ‐ Birth n  ‐ Death 
M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 
Flow(t-1) 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0080) 
Stock(t-1) -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0041) 
(Stock(t-1))2 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0035) 
Constant 1.845*** 1.836*** 2.081*** -2.192*** -2.190*** -2.189*** 
(0.1867) (0.1839) (0.2354) (0.0599) (0.0600) (0.0598) 
M1 M2 M3 
n : Constant 1.659*** 1.667*** 1.670*** 
(0.1418) (0.1414) (0.1412) 
LL -2582.75 -2560.11 -2550.78 
N 9360 9216 9216 
NOTES: Reported numbers are coefficients and standard errors (s.e.). ***,**, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. The squared birth/death stock variables are scaled by 1/100.  
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 Figure 3: Cross-industry means for the probability of being in a cartel 1951-1990 
 
Figure 4: Counterfactual analysis with different GDP shock scenarios 
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Finite HMM
To provide a formal deﬁnition for a HMM, let us assume that observations are
recorded at equally spaced integer times t = 1, 2, ..., Ti for cross-sectional units
i = 1, ..., N . The observed data for i follow a HMM if the hidden states, {Zit}Tit=1,
follow a Markov chain and if given Zit, observation Oit at time t for unit i is
independent of O1t, ..., Oi,t−1, Oi,t+1, ..., OiTi and Z1t, ..., Zi,t−1, Zi,t+1, ..., ZiTi .
This property means that in a standard HMM, the observations are independent
conditional on the sequence of hidden states.
The general econometric/statistical theory and scope of applications of the
HMMs is broad (see, e.g., Cappé, Moulines and Rydén 2005, Zucchini and
MacDonald 2009, on which this section builds), but for the purposes of our
analysis, we can focus on the case in which Zit takes on values from a ﬁnite set
(state space), SZ = {s1, s2, ..., sZ¯} , where Z¯ is known. We also assume that
Oit is a discrete (categorical) random variable, taking on values from a ﬁnite
(observation) set, SO = {o1, o2, ..., oO¯} , where O¯ is known. We deﬁne Oi to be
the Ti -dimensional vector of observations on i and O the
∑N
i=1Ti -dimensional
vector of all observations. The vectors of hidden states, Zi and Z, are deﬁned
similarly. Finally, we let xit denote the K-dimensional vector of covariate values
of unit i at t, with xi = {xi1, ...,xiTi} .
The HMM is fully speciﬁed by the initial and transition probabilities of the
hidden Markov chain and by the distribution of Oit, given Zit. For a cross-
sectional unit i, these three stochastic elements can be speciﬁed as follows:
First, the probability that unit i is at the unobserved state k ∈ SZ in the
initial period (i.e., Zi1 = k), given its contemporary covariate values. These
initial state probabilities are denoted
τki = P (Zi1 = k |xi1 ) .
Second, the (hidden) transition probabilities give the probability that unit i
is at state k ∈ SZ in period t, given that it was at state j ∈ SZ in period t− 1,
and given its covariate values. These transition probabilities are
ajkit = P (Zit = k|Zi,t−1 = j,xit).
This formulation shows that we allow the Markov chain to be non-homogenous
1
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(i.e., the transition probabilities can depend on a time index) and that condi-
tional on xit, the current state depends only on the previous state (the Markov
property).
The third stochastic element of the HMM are the observation (state-dependent)
probabilities. The observation probabilities give the probability of observing
w ∈ SO when the unobserved state is k ∈ SZ at t, i.e.,
bkit(w) = P (Oit = w|Zit = k,xit).
This formulation shows that bkit(w) can depend on covariates and that condi-
tional on xit, the observation at time t depends only on the current hidden state
and is independent of the previous observations (and states).
To derive the likelihood of the HMM, let Θ denote the model parameters,
Di1 the (Z¯× 1) vector with elements dki1(w) = τki bki1(w), Ditthe (Z¯× Z¯) matrix
with elements djkit (w) = a
jk
it b
k
it(w) for t > 1, and 1 the (Z¯ × 1) vector of ones.
As shown in e.g. MacDonald and Zucchini (2009, p. 37) and Altman (2007),
the likelihood for the whole observed data can be written as
L(Θ;o) =
N∏
i=1
{
(Di1)
′
(
Ti∏
t=2
Dit
)
1
}
where o denotes the data (the realization of O).
Appendix B: State Prediction
We consider three methods that can be used to analyze the hidden states of in-
dustry i at various points in time after the HMM has been estimated. The ﬁrst is
a recursive in-sample state prediction. It uses the estimated initial probabilities
and the transition matrix to obtain Pr [Zit = k] for t = 1, ..., Ti. The recursion
runs as follows: Pr [Zi1 = c] = (1 − τni ), Pr [Zi2 = c] = (1 − τni )acci2 + τni anci2 ,
and Pr [Zit = c] = Pr [Zi,t−1 = c] accit + Pr [Zi,t−1 = n] a
nc
it for t > 2, where the
probabilities refer to the estimates.
The other two methods are local and global decoding. To give a formal de-
scription of them, we build on Zucchini and MacDonald (2009) and introduce
some new notation. To this end, let O
(t)
i ≡ (Oi1, Oi2, ..., Oit) denote observa-
tion history of industry i from time 1 to t, with corresponding realization o
(t)
i .
Similarly, let O
(t+1,T )
i ≡ (Oi,t+1, ..., OiTi) denote 'future' from t+ 1 to Ti , with
2
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corresponding realization o
(t+1,T )
i . We further deﬁne LTi= (Di1)
′ (∏Ti
t=2Dit
)
1.
Finally, we need two (1 × Z) vectors, called the forward and backward proba-
bility vectors. For t = 1, ..., Ti, the former is deﬁned by
ζi,t ≡ (Di1)
′
(
t∏
s=2
Dis
)
.
This vector has property ζi,t = ζi,t−1Dit and its kth element, ζi,t(k), is the joint
probability Pr
[
O
(t)
i = o
(t)
i , Zit = k
]
.
The vector of backward probabilities is deﬁned by
i,t´ ≡
(
Ti∏
s=t+1
Dis1
)
.
The jth component of i,t´ is denoted i,t(k) and is equal to the conditional
probability Pr
[
O
(t,T )
i = o
(t,T )
i |Zit = k
]
. It can be shown that LTi= ζi,ti,t=
ζi,Ti1.
In local decoding, the interest is in ﬁnding the state that is most likely
to have generated the observed data. For industry i and period t, this most
probable state, k∗it, is
k∗it = argmaxk=1,...,Z¯Pr
[
Zit = k
∣∣∣O(T )i = o(T )i ]
where Pr
[
Zit = k
∣∣∣O(T )i = o(T )i ] = ζi,t(k)i,t(k)/LTi .
Our modiﬁcation to local decoding is that we use the probability of the most
probable state, not the k∗it. Assigning the latter is sensible e.g. in speech recog-
nition. Assigning the former makes more sense in our application. To elaborate,
imagine that a resource-constrained CA needs to decide which markets to inves-
tigate. Within our framework, it would want to investigate ﬁrst that market for
which the predicted probability of a cartel is highest, then the market with the
second highest probability of a cartel, and so on, until resources have been fully
allocated. Using the k∗it assignment would assign a c to all markets for which
the probability of a cartel is higher than 0.5, and thereby lose information that
the CA would want to use in its decision-making.
Global decoding looks for the entire sequence of states, z
(T )
i , which maxi-
mizes
3
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Pr
[
Z
(T )
i = z
(T )
i
∣∣∣O(T )i = o(T )i ]
where Z
(t)
i and z
(t)
i denote state histories. There is a dynamic programming
algorithm, called the Viterbi algorithm, which can be used to ﬁnd the optimal
sequence for industry i.
Appendix C: Data
[Figure C1  Birth and death ﬂow and stock here]
[Figure C2  Graph of GDP and trade variables here]
Appendix D: Hypothetical Cartel Data
Table D1 illustrates the type of observed data a cartel researcher might have
access to. For this hypothetical example, we set T = 5 and use the following
notation for the observed states: "Not in a cartel = n, "In a cartel = c,
"Detected and shut down by the CA = d, Leniency = l and "Unknown /
unobserved = u.
Table D1: Hypothetical cartel data
time/industry 1 2 3 4 5 6 ... N
t = 1 u u c c u u ... u
t = 2 u n c c n u ... u
t = 3 u c d c n u ... u
t = 4 d d u l u u ... u
t = 5 u u u u u u ... u
The (hypothetical) data tell us (see column 1), for example, that for industry
1, o1 = (u, u, u, d, u)
′. This industry had a cartel in period t = 4 that was
detected and shut down by the CA during that period. The records provide no
reliable information about its status prior to or after the detection. Industry 2
had a cartel in period t = 4 that was detected and shut down by the authorities
during that period. The cartel investigations reveal that the cartel had been up
and running for one year prior to its detection, and the court established that
4
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no cartel existed two years before the detection. However, the records provide
no realiable information about the status of the industry for period t = 1 or the
post-detection period t = 5. Industry 3 can be similarly interpreted; it enters
the data in a cartel.
For industry 4, the data are informative about one usage of the leniency
facility (t = 4). The investigations then revealed that the industry was in a
cartel for three years prior to a member applying for leniency. Industry 5 might
correspond to an industry that was suspected and investigated for having a
cartel over a two-year period. The records (e.g., the court decision) show that
it eventually turned out that the industry had no cartel.
For the remaining industries (i.e., for i = 6, ...,N in our hypothetical exam-
ple), the (published) records of the CA or courts provide no realiable information
about their status, perhaps because they have never been investigated for having
a cartel or perhaps because they were suspected of having one, but the evidence
was too weak to result in a published cartel case.
Appendix E: Hidden Process for Illegal Cartels
The Chang and Harrington model
Consider again CH, who model an industry where (identical) ﬁrms in an industry
each period simultaneously decide whether or not to collude and where collusion
can be detected by a CA. The CA is modelled as i) a detection (and prosecution
and conviction) probability σ ∈ [0, 1) and ii) penalty F/(1 − δ) paid by each
ﬁrm if a cartel is exposed. CH assume that F = γ(Y − αµ) where Y is the
(scaled) continuation payoﬀ from being in a cartel. Leniency is modeled as
follows: Firms have an incentive to apply for leniency only if their cartel breaks
down. If just one ﬁrm applies for leniency, it pays a ﬁne θF , where θ ∈ (0, 1),
while other ﬁrms pay F . If all ﬁrms apply for leniency simultaneously, each ﬁrm
pays a penalty ωF where ω ∈ (0, 1).
The sequence of events is the same in the main text, except that now, if
the industry colludes, the cartel may be exposed by the CA; this happens with
probability σ. It may also be exposed to the CA if at least one member of a
collapsing cartel applies for leniency. In either case, the cartel is shut down and
ﬁnes are levied. The structural parameters of this extended model are thus µ,
5
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α, η, HIC , κ, δ, σ, θ, ω and F , the ﬁrst six describing the industry and the last
four the prevailing antitrust policy.
CH show that the ICC of an industry takes the form
(1− δ)pi + δ[(1− σ)Y + σ(W − F )] ≥ (1− δ)ηpi + δ[W −min{σ, θ}F ], (1)
where Y (W ) is the scaled continuation payoﬀ from (not) being in a cartel and
F = γ(Y − αµ). Both are functions of (all of) the structural parameters. The
L.H.S. of the ICC has two parts. The ﬁrst denotes the current and the second
the expected proﬁts earned if there is collusion: In that case, the cartel is not
exposed with probability (1−σ) and it earns the continuation payoﬀ is Y . With
probability σ the cartel is exposed. Then the continuation payoﬀ is W and the
expected ﬁne F = γ(Y −αµ). On the R.H.S., the ﬁrst term are the proﬁts from
deviating. Deviating will yield the competitive continuation payoﬀ W , which
is the ﬁrst component of the second R.H.S. term. A deviating ﬁrm will apply
for leniency if the penalty from doing so is less than the expected penalty from
being caught, yielding the last component of the second term on the R.H.S. side
(i.e., min{σ, θ}F ).
The expected payoﬀ to being cartelized is deﬁned by a recursion that can be
solved through a ﬁxed point calculation. Using the ﬁxed point with collusion,
Y ∗, and rearranging (1) shows that the ICC can be rewritten in terms of pi:
pi ≤ φ∗ (2)
where φ∗ = 1(1−δ)(η−1) [
δ(1−σ)(1−κ)(1−δ)(Y ∗−αµ)
1−δ(1−κ) − δ(σ−min{σ, θ}γ(Y ∗−αµ)] on
the R.H.S is a measure of cartel stability.
To complete our speciﬁcation of the hidden process in the extended model
with illegal cartels, we note that the probability that inequality (2) holds for
industry i in period t is
Hit = HICDM (φ
∗
it − µit) (3)
where HICDM (•) again refers to the c.d.f. of the demeaned proﬁt shock.
6
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